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where it drew this line. Id. Most importantly, the Court noted that, because viability was the point at which
a fetus could survive outside the womb,
viability also marked the time when a
fetus became deserving ofstate protection.Id. at 2818. While recognizing
that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy before viability was the central holding of Roe, the Court pointed
out that Roe also recognized the importance ofthe state's interest in "potentiallife." Id.
The Court then examined the trimester framework established by Roe
in light ofthe state's interest in "potentiallife." Id. at 2819. The Court found
that the trimester framework had the
effect of contradicting some of the
state's permissible powers in the early
stages of a woman's pregnancy. Id.
Because the Court believed the trimester framework undervalued the state's
interest in "potential life," the Court
rejected the trimester framework
adopted in Roe. Id.
The Court next addressed whether
limitations on a woman's rightto abort
pre-viability fetuses were permissible.
Id. at 2819. The Court held that ifthe
law was not designed to strike at the
abortion right itself and had the incidental effect of making the right more
difficult to exercise, then such a law
would not be invalidated. Id. Only
where a law imposed an undue burden
on the exercise of the right would the
state be held to have interfered with the
liberty interest ofthe woman protected
by the Due Process Clause. Id. Under
the Court's analysis, laws which "do
no more than create a structural mechanism by which the state . . . may
express a profound respect for the life
ofthe unborn are permitted, if they are
not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to
choose." Id. at 2821.
The Court then applied the "undue
burden" standard to the provisions of
the Act. Id. at 2822. The Court first
addressed the Act's definition of"medical emergency" and found that it was
central to the operation of the other
provisions of the Act. Id. The Court
concluded that limiting abortions in
certain situations to medical emergencies, as defined under the Act and as
construed by the court of appeals imposed no "undue burden" on a

woman's right to an abortion. Id. at
2822.
The Court next addressed the informed consent requirement ofthe Act.
Id. The Court concluded that requiring
specific information be given to the
woman regarding the gestational age
of the unborn child, the availability of
alternatives to abortion and including a
mandatory 24 hour waiting period, did
not constitute an ''undue burden." Id.
at 2823-24. The Court reasoned that
even ifthe information given expressed
a preference for childbirth over abortion, the giving of truthful, non-misleading information ensured that a
woman understood the full impact of
her decision. Id. at 2823. In so holding, the Court overruled certain portions of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983) ("Akron f'), and Thornbird
v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.747
(1986). Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823.
Turning to the 24 hour waiting period, the Court overruled its decision in
Akron I which held that a 24 hour
waiting period served no legitimate
state concern. Id. at 2824. The Court
held that an informed decision would
be promoted by some period of reflection, particularly where information
concerning the abortion decision was
given to the woman. Id. The Court
acknowledged that the waiting period
was a substantial obstacle for women
who lacked financial resources or were
burdened by other considerations such .
as explaining their whereabouts to
employers or family. Id. at 2825.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
the effect of "increasing the cost and
risk of delay of abortions" did not
constitute an ''undue burden." Id.
Addressing the husband notification requirement of the Act, the Court
concluded that based on expert testimony and evidence presented to the
lower court regarding domestic violence, the husband notification requirement was likely to prevent a significant
numberofwomenfromobtainingabortions. Id. at 2829. The Court concluded that the father's interest in the
potential life did not justify permitting
a state to empower him with veto power
over his wife's decision. Id. at 2833.
The Court treated the parental notification requirements of the Act sum-

marily, holding that a state may require
consent of the parent or guardian prior
to a minor obtaining an abortion so
long as there is an adequate judicial
bypass. Id. at 2832. Finally, the Court
found the record keeping requirements
of the Act permissible. Id. The Court
held that the requirements were reasonably related to the ''preservation of
maternal health and. . . that they
properly respected a patient's confidentiality and privacy." Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood ofCentral Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976».
Thus, the Court upheld all of the
provisions of the Act with the exception of the husband notification requirement enunciating an ''undue burden" standard by which to assess the
constitutionality oflaws which restrict
a woman's right to choose abortion
prior to fetal viability. The opinion
was joined by concurring and dissenting opinions from all sides. While
accepting its responsibility to "defme
the freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution's ... promise of liberty,"
the Court has charted a course which
will continue to engender confusion
among courts and legislatures and endanger the liberty of women to control
their reproductive lives. Thus, it is
clear that the Court's decision in Casey
has not secured for women the constitutional protection oftheir liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
.
- Sue Lawless

CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc.:

FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING LAWS DO NOT PREEMPT
CERTAIN STATE AND COMMON
LAW ACTIONS.
In a controversial case of flI'St impression, the United States Supreme
Court held in Cipollonev. Liggett Group,
Inc., 112 s. Ct. 2608 (1992) that the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 ("1969 Act") did not preclude a
smoker who developed lungcancerfrom
suing cigarette manufacturers undercertain state and common law theories.
The smoker's claims for breach of express warranty, intentional ftaud and
misrepresentation, and conspiracy were
upheld despite the 1969 Act's warning
23.2 I The Law For u m
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label requirements. The Court indicated,
however, that a smoker's right to sue
tobacco companies was not absolute.
The Court found that the 1969 Act
preempted claims based on fuilure to
warn and fraudulent misrepresentation,
thereby limiting a smoker's causes of
action against tobacco companies.
Rose Cipollone began smoking in
1942. In 1983, after she developed lung
cancer, Cipollone and her husband filed
a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey
asserting New Jersey law. The suit was
against three cigarette manufucturers
and was based on theories of strict liability, negligence, express warranty,
and intentional tort. Cipollone died
from her illness in 1984 and her husband died shortly thereafter. Their son
maintained the action as executor of
their estates.
At trial, the cigarette manufacturers
argued that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of1965 (" 1965
Acf'), which required a conspicuous
label warning ofthe hazards ofcigarette
smoking, preempted common law
claims against cigarette manufacturers
for health injuries received from smoking. The manufucturers also contended
that the 1969 Act, which had spurred the
fumous cautionary label stating ''Warning: the Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Hazardous To Your Health," protected cigarette makers from all liability. After
first allowing the claims, the district
court ultimately ruled that the plaintiff's
claims of breach of express warranty,
fililureto warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy were preempted
by the 1965 and 1969 Acts to the extent
that these claims relied upon the manufucturers' advertising, promotional, and
public relations activities after the effective date ofthe 1965 Act The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affinned
the district court's ruling on this issue.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the preemptive effect of the federal statutes.
The Court began its analysis by
examining the 1965 Act. Cipollone v.

Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2608,
2616 (1992). Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens looked to the preemption provision ofthe 1965 Act which
stated that "[n]o statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in
the advertising of [properly labeled]
cigarettes." Id. at 2618 (quoting Pub.L.
89-92, 79 Stat. 282, amended by 15
U.S.C. 1331-40, § 5(b» (emphasis in
the original). The Court found that although the preemption provision did
prohibit state and federal rule-making
bodies from requiring that certain warning labels be placed on cigarette labels,
the preemption provision did not preclude state law remedies. Cipollone 112
S. Ct at 2618. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that there was a
presumption against the preemption of
state police power regulations, including state law damages actions. Id. The
Court also stated that "[t]here is no
general, inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued validity
of state common law damage actions."
Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the
Plaintiffs personal representative could
maintain an action for damages incurred
by the Plaintiffpriorto the enactment of
the 1969 Act. Id. at 2619.
After finding that the 1965 Act did
not preempt state common law claims,
Justice Stevens examined the 1969 Act
Writing for a plurality offour justices,
Stevens compared the language of the
1969 Act with its predecessor. Id. The
Court first noted that the amended preemption provision of the 1969 Act was
broader than the 1965 Act Id. Section
5 of the 1969 Act provides that "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are [lawfully] labeled" Id. at 2617 (quoting
Pub.L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, amended by
15 U.S.C. 1331-40, § 5(b». This language barring requirements or prohibitions imposed under state law was substantially broader than the 1965 Act's
preemption provision whichmerelypro-

hibited health statements in smoking
advertisements. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct
at 2619. Because of the modified language, the Court opined that the scope
ofthe preemption provision in the 1969
ActsubstantiaUy differed from the reach
ofthe 1965 Act. Id. at 2619-20.
In analyzing the significance of the
changes between the two acts, the Court
noted that the phrase ''requirement or
prohibition" in the 1969 Aa suggested
no distinction between positive enactments and the common law. Id at 2620.
The Court asserted that the plain language of the statute encompassed obligations that take the fonn of common
law rules. Id. The Court thus rejected
the petitioner's 8IgUIDent that the phrase
''requirement orprohibition"limited the
1969 Aa's preemptive scope to positive enactments by legis1aturesandagencies. Id
.The Court, however, went on to
find that although the preemption provision was not limited to positive enactments, it did not necessarily mean all
common law claims were preempted
Id at 2621. The Court determined that
becausethe statute did not indicate which
common law claims were preempted,
each of the petitioner's claims required
individual examination. Id The Court
stated that the central inquiry for each of
the petitioner's common Iawclaimsmust
be whether the legal duty that predicated the damages action constituted a
requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health imposed under State
law with respect to advertising or promotion under the 1969 Act Id
Turning to the petitioner's specific
allegations, the Court first examined the
petitioner's claims of a failure to warn
due to negligence in testing and advertising and lack ofadequate warnings of
the consequences of smoking. Id The
Court found that the failure to warn
claims relied on an assumption that the
manufucturers should have had additional warnings in their post-1969 advertising. Id. Finding that those claims
relied upon a state law ''requirement or
prohibition" related to advertising or
promotion, the Court concluded that the
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1969 Act preempted the failure to warn
actions to the extent they relied on a
showing that manufacturers should have
had additional warnings. [d. at 262122. The Court, however, noted that the
1969 Act did not preempt the petitioner's
fuilure to warn claims that relied solely
on the manufacturers' research or testing practices or other actions unrelated
to advertising. [d. at 2622.
The Court next addressed the
petitioner's claim for breach of express
warranty. [d. Noting that an express
warranty is not a requirement imposed
under state law but is a voluntary under. taking by the manufacturer/warrantor,
the Court stated that a claim for breach
of warranty was not preempted by the
1969 Act. [d. at 2622-23.
Turning to the petitioner's allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation,
the Court first analyzed the claim that
the manufacturers' advertising counteracted the effect of the federal warning
labels. [d. at 2623. The Court stated that
because section 5 of the 1969 Act preempted state law prohibitions as well as
requirements, the petitioner's claims
based on state law prohibitions against
advertising that minimized the hazards
ofsmoking was preempted by the 1969
Act. [d. In addressing the petitioner's
second fraudulent misrepresentation
claim based on allegations that the manufacturers intentionally concealed material facts about the hazards of smoking,
the Court noted that the petitioner's
actions were not predicated on a duty
under the 1969 Act but rather on a
general duty not to deceive. [d. at 2624.
Thus, the Court found that the
petitioner's clams based on fraud in
advertising were not preempted by the
1969 Act. [d.
Finally, the Court examined the
petitioner's claim ofconspiracy to misrepresent [d The Court found that the
conspimcy claim was not preempted
because the underlying duty in such a
claim was a duty not to conspire to
commit fraud, rather than a duty imposed by the 1969 Act [d. at 2624-25.
Justice Blackmun, after joining the
majority in the opinion regarding the

1965 Act, wrote separately for three
justices and concluded that none of the
petitioner's claims were preempted by
the 1969 Act. [d. at 2625-26. Thus,
Blackmun concurred only in the judgment that certain claims based on fuilure
to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation,
express warranty and conspiracy were
not preempted by the 1965 Act. [d.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the 1965 Act preempted petitioner's failure to warn
claims and that the 1969 Act preempted
allofthepetitioner'scommonlawclaims
under the ordinary meaning ofthe statutory language. [d. at 2632. Consequently, Justice Scalia concurred only
in the part ofthe judgment that held that
the petitioner's failure to warn and
fraudulent misrepresentation claims
were preempted. [d. at 2637.
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court
held that under certain circumstances,
cigarette manufacturers can be held liable for the health problems ofsmokers,
notwithstanding the existence of warning labels on cigarette packages. Although the ruling bars claims thatadvertising and labeling did not adequately
warn smokers of the health hazards of
smoking, it allows claims alleging misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, conspiracy, and fraud as well as
certain failure to warn claims. This
decision may provoke thousands ofnew
suits filed by smokers against tobacco
companies. More significantly,
Cipollone may have set a precedent to
allow consumers to bring suit in cases
involving any product regulated by the
federal government, including over-thecounter medications and alcoholic beverages, in which manufacturers may
have hidden or misrepresented possible
side effects of their products to the
public.
-Ellen Ann Marth

Burson v. Freeman: STATUTE
PROHIBITING THE DISPLAY
AND DISTRIBUTION OF CAMPAIGN MATERIALS WImIN 100
FEET OF A POLLING PLACE
DOES NOT VIOLATE mE FIRST
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
The Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of a longstanding tradition of
regulating campaign related speech in
the areas surrounding a polling place.
In Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992), a plurality of the Court held
that a Tennessee law establishing a
100-foot campaign free zone satisfied
a strict scrutiny analysis because it was
necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and was narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. This opinion may
prove to be more important because
the substance of the statute, which
regulated expressive conduct near a
polling place, was upheld by only a
plurality of the Court.
Respondent, Mary Rebecca Freeman ("Freeman"), filed suit in the Chancery Court while working as treasurer
for a political campaign in Tennessee.
Freemanallegedthatsection2-7-111(b)
of the Tennessee Code, which prohibits the solicitation of votes and the
display or distribution of campaign
material within 100 feet of a polling
place, unconstitutionally restricted her
ability to communicate with voters in
violation of her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. The court
dismissed her suit, finding that the law
was not in violation of either the Tennessee or the United States Constitutions. The Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that the State had a
compelling interest in banning such
activities inside the polling place but
not in the area surrounding it. The
court concluded that the law was not
narrowly drawn and that it did not
represent the least restrictive means
available to protect the State's interest.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, reversed, and upheld the Tennessee statute because it
23.2 I The Law For u m
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